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SUPERIOR COURT
OF GUAM
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM

JAMES JARINA OUANO, individually and as the Executor of the Estate of CARMELINA J. OUANO,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CARMEL O. PAULE,

Defendant.

CIVIL CASE NO. CV0071-24

DECISION AND ORDER DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Carmel O. Paule moves the Court for summary judgment on all claims in Plaintiff James J. Ouano's First Amended Complaint. The claims arise from a dispute between the siblings over properties devised to them under the estate of their late father, which their mother, Carmelina J. Ouano, was to hold in trust for them during their minority. Genuine disputes remain concerning whether James's deed to Carmel was an unconditional gift, whether his conveyance formed part of a reciprocal property-distribution arrangement, and what the parties understood about their mother's ownership and authority over the properties.

Having carefully considered the Motion, the Opposition, the Reply, the record, and the arguments of counsel, the Court concludes that the Motion should be GRANTED as to the fraud-in-the-inducement claim and DENIED as to the remaining claims.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After Carmelina died in 2021, her son, James, was appointed executor of her estate and attempted to distribute the estate's assets. *In the Matter of Est. Carmelina J. Ouano,* PR0090-21 (Am. Inventory (June 30, 2022), (Am. Pet. Distrib. (June 30, 2022)). The petition for

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distribution listed James as the sole devisee of the "Tamuning properties" and Carmelina's grandchildren as the joint devisees of the "Mariposa Court property." Carmel objected, first asserting that she and James both held a one-quarter interest in the Tamuning and Mariposa Court properties, while Carmelina's estate held the other half. Decl. George Valdes, Ex. 3 (June 4, 2024). Carmel later amended her objection to assert that Carmelina held only a trust or lifetime interest and that Carmel and James owned the properties as beneficiaries. *Id.*, Ex. 4. The probate court stayed the distribution pending resolution of this civil action. PR0090-21 (Order (Feb. 20, 2026)).

In this case, James asserts five claims: (1) quiet title; (2) breach of contract; (3) fraud in the inducement; (4) mutual mistake; and (5) unjust enrichment. First Am. Compl. ("FAC") (Oct. 28, 2024). James generally argues that, while Carmelina was alive, James conveyed his interest in properties in Harmon and North Fadang, Dededo, to Carmel, in exchange for interests Carmel held in the Tamuning properties. Carmel moves for summary judgment, arguing that because only James and Carmel (not their mother) had interests in the four properties (Tamuning, Mariposa Court, Harmon, and Fadang), James's conveyance was completed and constituted an unconditional gift to Carmel. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (May 7, 2026). James opposes, arguing that his deed was part of a broader family property-distribution arrangement and that the parties executed the deeds under a mistaken understanding of Carmelina's ownership and authority. Pls.' Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. (June 4, 2026).

II. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

The following facts are undisputed based on the record presented to the Court and for the purposes of the motion for summary judgment.

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1. Segundo Dela Cruz Ouano died testate in 1990. FAC ¶ 8 (Oct. 28, 2024); Answer ¶ 8 (Nov. 18, 2024).
2. Segundo's Last Will and Testament devised four property groups: (1) three lots in Tamuning; (2) Lot 5105 in Harmon; (3) the North Fadang residence in Dededo; and (4) the Mariposa Court residence in Dededo. FAC ¶ 7; Answer ¶ 7.
3. The Will devised those properties to Segundo's wife, Carmelina, "and his two children by her, Carmel and James, to be held by Carmelina in trust" for the children. FAC ¶ 9; Answer ¶ 9.
4. The Will authorized Carmelina, if circumstances changed in a way not foreseeable when the Will was executed, to sell the properties at best market price. Under the Will, one-half of the proceeds from such a sale would be distributed to Carmelina, and the remaining one-half would be divided equally between Carmel and James. CVR 56.1 Stmt. Issues & Stmt. Undisputed Material Facts ("SUMF"), Ex. C (May 7, 2026).
5. The Superior Court implemented that devise the probate of Segundo's estate. *In the Matter of Est. Segundo Dela Cruz Ouano*, PR0026-91 (Decree Final Distrib. (Nov. 18, 1991)).
6. The Decree ordered that the properties be held "in trust by the Widow for the said minors, but with absolute power of sale," with sale proceeds divided between Carmelina and the children. FAC ¶ 11; Answer ¶ 11.
7. Carmelina administered the properties and entered into leases while holding the properties in trust. Decl. Phillip Torres ¶ 12 (June 4, 2026).

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8. In 2016, Carmelina undertook estate planning with Attorney Phillip Torres and asked him to prepare her Last Will and Testament and deeds of gift for the Tamuning, Harmon, and North Fadang properties. *Id.* ¶ 10.
9. Because of their strained relationship, discussions with James and Carmel concerning the distribution of the properties occurred separately. FAC ¶ 15; Answer ¶ 15.
10. On or about May 20, 2016, Carmelina and James executed deeds of gift as co-grantors conveying their interests in the Harmon and Fadang properties to Carmel. FAC ¶¶ 25–26; SUMF ¶¶ 66–67, 77.
11. The deeds identify Carmel as the grantee and state that the properties were conveyed "for and in consideration of the love and affection" of the grantors. SUMF ¶¶ 77–78, Exs. X–Y.
12. The deeds do not contain provisions whereby Carmel agreed to transfer, waive, release or disclaim any interest in the Tamuning Properties. The deeds also do not contain any indication that she waived any objection to James receiving the Tamuning Properties under Carmelina's Will. *See id.,* Exs. X-Y.
13. Carmelina's Will devised her interest in the Tamuning properties to James, and the Mariposa Court property to her grandchildren. SUMF, Ex. W. Carmelina's Will is silent as to the Harmon and Fadang Properties. *Id.*
14. James did not see Carmelina's will when he executed the deeds of gift. SUMF, ¶ 117.
15. Carmelina died in April 2021. Decl. Phillip Torres¶ 18; Decl. George Valdes, Ex. 3 at 3.
16. After Carmelina's death, Carmel sold the Harmon property. Decl. Philip Torres, ¶ 18.

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The parties dispute whether the deeds and Carmelina's Will implemented an agreement among Carmelina, James, and Carmel; whether Carmel knew that James was expected to receive the Tamuning Properties; what the parties understood concerning Carmelina's ownership and authority; and whether James intended the deeds as unconditional gifts. Those matters are addressed below under the summary-judgment standard. Because those disputes affect the five asserted claims differently, the Court addresses the legal effect of the deeds before turning to each claim.

III. LAW AND DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Guam Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs the Court to grant summary judgment if the movant shows that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Guam R. Civ. P. 56(a); *Cho v. Alupang Beach Club, Inc.*, 2025 Guam 3 ¶ 28. A factual dispute is genuine when sufficient evidence would permit a factfinder to resolve the issue for the nonmovant. *Iizuka Corp. v. Kawasho Int'l (Guam), Inc.*, 1997 Guam 10 ¶ 7. A fact is material when it is relevant to an element of a claim or defense and could affect the suit's outcome. *Id.*

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. *Cho*, 2025 Guam 3 ¶ 28. Once the movant makes that showing, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." *DFS Guam L.P. v. A.B. Won Pat Int'l Airport Auth.*, 2020 Guam 20 ¶ 35.[1]

[1] Carmel argues that James failed to comply with CVR 56.1 by failing to submit paragraph-by-paragraph responses to her SUMF and that the Court should deem her facts admitted. Even assuming CVR 56.1 was not strictly followed, the Court declines to grant summary judgment on

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The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. *Id.* at ¶ 36; *Camacho v. Perez*, 2017 Guam 16 ¶ 13; *Edwards v. Pac. Fin. Corp.*, 2000 Guam 27 ¶ 7. The Court does not weigh competing evidence or make credibility determinations; those functions are reserved for the factfinder. *See* GRCP 56(e); *Guam Sansko Trans., Inc. v. Pac. Modair Corp.*, 2012 Guam 2 ¶ 10.

Applying these principles, the Court begins with the parties' competing characterizations of the deeds because that issue informs each remaining claim. The Court then considers whether the record permits a finding of an enforceable reciprocal arrangement, whether the evidence supports fraud or mutual mistake, and whether the unresolved factual disputes preclude judgment on the quiet-title and unjust-enrichment claims.[2]

B. The Alleged Reciprocal Arrangement and the Legal Effect of James's Deed

This case's central issue is whether James's deeds to Carmel were unconditional gifts or conveyances made as part of a broader family property-distribution arrangement. An unconditional gift would preclude a breach of contract claim, though not necessarily mutual

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that basis. Rule 56 ultimately requires the Court to determine whether the record reveals a genuine dispute of material fact. The declarations, pleadings, probate filings, deposition testimony, and documentary evidence cited by the parties identify genuine disputes concerning the formation and terms of the alleged arrangement, regardless of any procedural deficiency in the opposing statement of facts.

[2] The parties frequently refer to "Plaintiffs" collectively. The motion, however, largely addresses the claims asserted by James in his individual capacity, and the parties do not separately develop arguments concerning the distinct interests of Carmelina's Estate. Accordingly, except where otherwise noted, the Court refers to James individually when discussing the formation of the alleged agreement, reliance, and related tort and contract theories. Any determination concerning ownership interests remains subject to the Estate's asserted interests and the proceedings in PR0090-21.

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mistake; and, a reciprocal arrangement could support either theory. The Court therefore first considers whether summary judgment can resolve either characterization.

A conveyance is a transfer of an interest in real property from one person to another. Guam law recognizes a grant as a means of transferring an estate or interest in land. 21 GCA §§ 4101–4102. An inter vivos gift is a particular type of conveyance that requires: (1) present donative intent; (2) delivery; and (3) acceptance. *Turnbull v. Thomsen*, 171 Cal. App. 2d 779, 784 (Ct. App. 1959); *see also* Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 6.1 (2003). Donative intent means the donor intends a gratuitous transfer of title. Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 6.1. Because donative intent concerns the transfer's purpose, evidence outside the instrument may be relevant when a donor contends that the instrument does not reflect the transaction's true character. *See* 6 GCA § 2511; *see e.g. Williams v. Williams*, 90 Cal. Rptr. 457, 460 (Ct. App.1970) (parol evidence may establish the absence of donative intent without a separate showing of fraud, mistake, or undue influence).

The deeds here are strong evidence supporting Carmel's position. They are labeled "Deed of Gift," recite "love and affection" as consideration, and were recorded shortly after execution. Those facts strongly support Carmel's characterization of the conveyances as completed gifts. The facial terms of the deeds, however, do not end the inquiry because James contends that the instruments formed only one part of a larger contemporaneous transaction. The Court therefore considers whether the surrounding evidence creates a genuine dispute concerning the purpose of the conveyances.

James states that he transferred his interests as part of an arrangement under which Carmel would immediately receive the Harmon and Fadang Properties, he would receive the

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Tamuning properties through Carmelina's estate plan, and the Mariposa property would pass to the grandchildren. He further states that, given his strained relationship with Carmel, he would not have transferred valuable property interests to her without receiving something in return. The timing and circumstances of the instruments corroborate that account, as the deeds and Carmelina's will were prepared and executed during the same estate-planning process. Viewed in James's favor, that evidence could support an inference that the instruments were intended to implement a single property-distribution plan.

The record also supports the contrary inference. Carmel argues that the deed's four corners, including its "love and affection" recital, conclusively establish a gift and demonstrate that the conveyance was valid and complete. But those formalities are not necessarily conclusive where other evidence creates a genuine dispute concerning the transaction's purpose and the parties' intent. The recorded deed is evidence that James executed and delivered his interests to Carmel, which is a facially valid conveyance. However, it does not, standing alone, establish that the conveyance was unconditional, gratuitous, or unaffected by an alleged contemporaneous agreement or mistake. The Court therefore need not invalidate the deed to deny summary judgment—rather, it must only determine whether the deed conclusively resolves the pleaded claims as a matter of law.

James does not assert lack of donative intent as an independent cause of action. Instead, his evidence concerning donative intent speaks to whether the transaction involved an enforceable exchange, a material mistake, or circumstances making Carmel's retention inequitable. A reasonable factfinder could therefore conclude that James executed the deeds as part of the alleged reciprocal arrangement rather than as unconditional gifts. That conclusion

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does not establish that an enforceable contract existed. It means only that the deeds do not foreclose the contract, mistake, or equitable theories as a matter of law. The Court therefore turns to whether the alleged arrangement satisfies the requirements of contract formation.

C. Breach of Contract

James's breach-of-contract claim depends on whether he and Carmel formed an enforceable agreement concerning the distribution of the family properties and whether Carmel failed to perform an obligation under that agreement. The deed's formal recitals do not resolve that question because the parties dispute what they understood the 2016 transactions to accomplish. A contract requires parties capable of contracting, the parties' consent, a lawful object, and a "sufficient cause or consideration." 18 GCA § 85102. Consent must be free, mutual, and communicated by each party to the other. 18 GCA § 85301. Consent is not mutual unless the parties "agree upon the same thing in the same sense." 18 GCA § 85316. An implied-in-fact contract arises from conduct that manifests mutual assent, but a party's "subjective belief in the existence of a . . . contract is not, without more, evidence of the existence of the contract." *Quijano v. Atkins-Kroll, Inc.*, 2008 Guam 14 ¶ 10. A breach occurs when a party fails to perform a contractual obligation without legal excuse.

Carmel argues that the alleged arrangement fails for several related reasons. She emphasizes that James never discussed it directly with her, that the deeds contain no reciprocal promise, and that his account depends substantially on what Carmelina allegedly told him. She further argues that Carmelina lacked authority to bind her and that any agreement affecting real property would be unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds.

The agency argument narrows, but does not resolve, the formation issue. The record does not establish that Carmelina possessed actual or apparent authority to contract on Carmel's

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behalf. James's theory, however, is not that Carmelina bound Carmel as an agent. He contends that Carmel personally assented and that her assent may be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and conduct. The relevant question is therefore whether the record would permit a reasonable factfinder to infer Carmel own assent.

The Court likewise declines to resolve the Statute of Frauds defense before determining what, if anything, the parties agreed to. The application of that defense, including any asserted exception, depends on the agreement's existence, terms, and manner of performance. Because those predicate matters remain disputed, the Statute of Frauds does not provide an independent basis for summary judgment on the present record.

The evidence concerning Carmel's assent support competing inferences. First, Carmel accepted deeds conveying James's interests in the Harmon and North Fadang properties. The record reflects the siblings had a strained relationship and limited communication. A factfinder could infer that James was unlikely to transfer valuable real-property interests to Carmel without an accompanying understanding concerning the Tamuning properties. Carmel's acceptance of the deeds does not establish that understanding, but it is circumstantial evidence relevant to what she may have understood the transaction to accomplish.

Second, the deeds and Carmelina's Will were executed on the same day, as part of a single estate-planning engagement with Attorney Torres. A factfinder could infer that the deeds and Will were intended to implement one family property-distribution plan.

Third, the parties give conflicting accounts of the meetings at Attorney Torres's office. Torres's declaration supports James's account that the parties acknowledged an agreement, while

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Carmel denies attending or agreeing to the alleged arrangement. These conflicting versions raise credibility issues that are classically suitable for resolution at trial, not summary judgment.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to James, a factfinder could reasonably conclude that Carmel understood and assented to a reciprocal arrangement. James also alleges that Carmel later breached that arrangement by objecting to his receipt of the Tamuning Properties and asserting an ownership position inconsistent with the alleged agreement. Whether those acts constituted a breach depends on whether the parties formed an enforceable agreement and what obligations it imposed.

The requested remedy presents a separate question. Carmel further argues that the relief James seeks would improperly alter ownership interests arising from Segundo's Will and the trust created thereunder. To the extent Carmel challenges the availability of specific performance or other requested remedies, the Court need not resolve those issues at this stage. The present motion principally concerns whether the record establishes, as a matter of law, that no enforceable agreement existed. Because genuine disputes remain concerning formation, assent, and the terms of the alleged arrangement, questions concerning the availability and scope of any remedy are more appropriately addressed after those underlying factual issues are resolved.

The record therefore presents genuine disputes concerning Carmel's assent, the terms of the alleged arrangement, and whether her later conduct was inconsistent with an obligation imposed by that arrangement, thereby rendering summary judgment on the breach of contract claim improper.

D. Fraud in the Inducement

The contract claim survives because assent may, in appropriate circumstances, be inferred from conduct and surrounding circumstances. The fraud claim requires different proof. To

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establish fraud in the inducement, James must show: (1) a misrepresentation; (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) intent to induce reliance; (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damages. *Gov't of Guam v. Gutierrez*, 2015 Guam 8 ¶ 29. The misrepresentation must be made by the defendant to the plaintiff. *Id.* at ¶ 28.

Measured against these elements, the fraud claim fails. Carmel argues that James cannot identify a direct misrepresentation that she made to him. The Court agrees. James alleges that Carmel agreed he would receive the Tamuning properties through Carmelina's Will. FAC ¶¶ 18–22. But James does not identify any statement by Carmel conveying that alleged agreement to him. Instead, his account rests on statements Carmelina allegedly made to him concerning Carmel's supposed agreement. Those statements may be relevant to whether the parties entered a broader property-distribution arrangement. They do not, however, establish that Carmel made a false representation to James. Nor does the record contain evidence that Carmel concealed a material fact, or acted with the intent to induce James to execute the deed.

Carmel's conduct alone cannot support the required misrepresentation. Carmel's acceptance of the deeds and her later position in the probate proceeding may speak to the parties' alleged agreement, mutual mistake, and the equities of retaining the transferred interests or proceeds. Those facts do not, without more, establish the elements of fraud in the inducement. In particular, they do not provide evidence of a false representation by Carmel, knowledge of its falsity, or an intent to induce James's reliance when he executed the deeds.

Because James has not identified evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find that Carmel made a material misrepresentation to him, Carmel is entitled to summary judgment on the fraud-in-the-inducement claim.

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E. Mutual Mistake

Although the absence of a representation defeats the fraud claim it does not dispose of the mutual mistake claim. Mutual mistake asks not whether Carmel made a false representation, but whether James and Carmel shared a mistaken understanding about Carmelina's ownership interest or authority when the deeds were executed. A party may rescind a contract if consent was given by mistake. 18 GCA § 89202(1). Mutual mistake permits rescission when the parties share a mistaken belief about a basic assumption that materially affected their exchange. *See* 18 GCA § 89202(1); *M. Elec. Corp. v. Phil-Gets (Guam) Int'l Trading Corp.*, 2012 Guam 23 ¶ 24; *Earl v. Saks & Co.*, 226 P.2d 340, 344–345 (Cal. 1951). A unilateral mistake is not enough unless caused by the other party's fraud or misrepresentation. *Gov't of Guam*, 2015 Guam 8 ¶ 28.

James represents that he, Carmelina, and Carmel all believed Carmelina owned an interest in the properties and that the deeds and Will implemented a family property-distribution plan. Carmel disputes that account. She maintains that she did not understand that James was to receive the Tamuning properties and that she first learned the contents of Carmelina's will in 2021. Attorney Torres's declaration supports James's account, while billing records and Carmel's testimony support Carmel's account. The documentary history provides additional evidence, but it does not eliminate that conflict.

Carmel also points to numerous pre-2016 probate filings, lease documents, assignments, and related recorded instruments identifying Carmelina as trustee rather than fee-simple owner. According to Carmel, those documents establish that no mistake existed because the parties were on notice of the trust structure governing the properties. That evidence supports Carmel's position and may ultimately prove persuasive to the factfinder. It does not, however, eliminate

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all factual disputes. The parties dispute what significance they attributed to those documents, what they understood about Carmelina's ownership rights and powers, and whether they believed Carmelina possessed authority to carry out the 2016 property-distribution plan reflected in the deeds and her Will. Those disputed questions go directly to the existence and scope of any alleged mistake and cannot be resolved on summary judgment

Other evidence points in the opposite direction. In her initial probate objection, Carmel asserted that Carmelina owned a 50-percent interest in certain properties. That position is not an independent basis for determining what Carmel believed in 2016, particularly because she later amended it. It may nevertheless provide circumstantial evidence of her understanding when she accepted the deeds from James and Carmelina. The alleged mistake concerning Carmelina's ownership or authority is material because it goes to the property interests the parties believed they were transferring and receiving.

Carmel responds that any limitation on Carmelina's authority as trustee is immaterial because the beneficiaries themselves participated in the transaction and thereby consented to it. This is a related (not independent) issue that need not be resolved on summary judgment. The argument depends substantially on what the parties understood about the nature of their interests, Carmelina's authority, and the legal effect of the deeds at the time of the transaction. Those matters remain genuinely disputed. Accordingly, the trustee-consent theory does not entitle Carmel to judgment as a matter of law at this stage. The parties' different views about the legal effect of the deeds and Carmelina's Will provided additional context, although the Court does not treat a disagreement about legal consequences alone as a mutual mistake of fact.

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Finally, Carmel argues that mutual mistake cannot apply absent an agreement. The Court need not resolve that issue on summary judgment because the record contains a genuine dispute both about whether an agreement existed and about what James and Carmel understood concerning Carmelina's ownership and authority. A factfinder could reasonably determine that James and Carmel shared a mistaken belief about a basic assumption that materially affected the transaction. Summary judgment on the mutual-mistake claim is therefore improper.

F. Quiet Title and Unjust Enrichment

Unresolved questions about the deeds, the alleged arrangement, and the parties' understanding also prevent summary judgment on the two remaining claims. The quiet-title claims concern the parties' legal interests in the properties, while unjust enrichment concerns whether Carmel may equitably retain the interests or proceeds she received.

As to quiet title, a person claiming an interest in real property may bring an action against another who asserts an adverse interest, and the Court determines the parties' respective interests. 21 GCA § 25101. James's quiet-title claim turns on the legal effect of his deed—specifically, whether James retains an interest adverse to Carmel's claimed ownership. That question depends on whether the deed was an unconditional gift, whether it implemented an enforceable reciprocal arrangement, and whether the transaction is subject to rescission or other relief based on mistake. Because genuine disputes remain concerning those issues, the Court cannot determine the parties' respective interests as a matter of law at this stage.

Next, unjust enrichment requires: (1) a benefit conferred; (2) the defendant's knowledge or appreciation of it; and (3) circumstances making retention inequitable. *Goodwind Dev. Corp. v. W. Bay Corp.*, 2025 Guam 14 ¶ 89. The unjust enrichment claim presents a related but distinct equitable questions: whether Carmel's retention of the property or its proceeds would be

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inequitable. That inquiry includes whether James intended to make a true gift, whether the parties acted under a shared misunderstanding, and whether Carmel accepted the property as part of the alleged reciprocal arrangement. Those questions likewise remain disputed for the reasons discussed above, rendering summary judgment on the unjust-enrichment claim improper.

IV. CONCLUSION

The record does not permit the Court to resolve as a matter of law the parties' competing accounts of the 2016 transactions, the legal effect of James's deeds, or the parties' respective interests in the properties. Those unresolved issues require a trial on the breach-of-contract, mutual-mistake, quiet-title, and unjust-enrichment claims. The fraud-in-the-inducement claim stands differently because the record contains no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that Carmel made a material misrepresentation to James.

Accordingly, Defendant Carmel's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to James's fraud-in-the-inducement claim and DENIED as to the remaining claims.

SO ORDERED, 3 November 2026.

HON. ELYZE M. IRIARTE
Judge, Superior Court of Guam

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