

FILED  
CLERK OF COURT

2026 MAR -5 PM 3:42

SUPERIOR COURT  
OF GUAM

**IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM**

7	PEOPLE OF GUAM,	)	CRIMINAL CASE NO. <b>CF0441-24</b>
8		)	GPD REPORT NO. 24-13712
9	vs.	)	
10		)	DECISION AND ORDER
11	<b>JOHN A. APOLONIO,</b>	)	RE. DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
12	DOB: 03/28/2007	)	REMOVAL TO FAMILY COURT
13	Defendant.	)	

**INTRODUCTION**

This matter is before the Honorable Maria T. Cenzone on Defendant John A. Apolonio's ("Defendant" or "Defendant Apolonio") Motion for Removal to Family Court (the "Motion"). Representing the Defendant is Assistant Public Defender Zachary C. Taimanglo. Representing the People of Guam ("the People") is Assistant Attorney General Christine S. Tenorio. After hearing oral arguments from the parties, the Court took the matter under advisement pursuant to CVR 7.1(e)(6)(D) of the LOCAL RULES OF THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM.

After reviewing the Defendant's Motion, the People's Opposition, oral arguments from the parties, and the applicable statutes and case law, the Court now issues its Decision and Order **DENYING** Defendant's Motion.

**PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

On June 27, 2024, the grand jury returned an Indictment against Defendant Apolonio for the following offenses: the First Charge of Vehicular Homicide (As a Second Degree Felony),

1 the Second Charge of Vehicular Homicide While Driving Impaired (As a Second Degree Felony),  
2 and Vehicular Negligence (As a Third Degree Felony). The Declaration of Probable Cause  
3 recounts the following alleged event:. On the night of June 11, 2024, at about 10:00 PM to 11:00  
4 PM, G.C. (17-years-old) and K.P. (16-years-old) obtained alcohol from a relative at the Hemlani  
5 Apartments. *Decl. of Prob. Cause* (Jun. 27, 2024) at 1. Defendant Apolonio (17-years-old) and  
6 E.T. (15-years-old) rendezvoused with G.C. and K.P at about 11:00 PM, where Defendant drank  
7 three (3) shots of vodka. *Id.* E.T. obtained a blue Toyota Yaris without his mother's knowledge  
8 and drove the group to GHURA<sup>1</sup> housing in Mongmong, then to Ironwood Estates in Toto, and  
9 finally parking in Paseo. *Id.* At a nearby fishing platform, the Defendant took an additional two  
10 (2) shots of vodka. *Id.* Defendant stated that they did not drink in the vehicle, and K.P. recounted  
11 that the Defendant took the vodka bottle to the fishing platform. *Id.* Defendant further recounted  
12 that he had six (6) to seven (7) shots of vodka between Hemlani Apartments and Paseo but could  
13 not recount the additional two (2) shots. *Id.*

14  
15  
16  
17 Defendant Apolonio asked E.T. to drive the vehicle, whereupon E.T. handed the  
18 Defendant the keys to the Toyota Yaris. *Id.* According to E.T., K.P. and the Defendant were the  
19 only members of the group to drink that night on the platform. *Id.* Defendant recounts that he did  
20 not adjust the driver's seat, and he was very close to the steering wheel while driving. *Id.* While  
21 the Defendant recounts driving at 50 to 60 MPH on West O'Brien Drive, E.T. recounts their speed  
22 at 70 to 80 MPH. *Id.* EDR Crash Data retrieved from the crashed vehicle confirms E.T.'s account,  
23 indicating that the vehicle was traveling at 75 MPH with a maximum rate of 78 MPH. *Id.* Unable  
24 to steer clear of road bumps at the Father Duenas intersection, the Defendant lost control of the  
25 vehicle and collided with a telephone pole. *Id.* G.C. and K.P., rear passengers at the time of the  
26  
27

28  

---

<sup>1</sup> Guam Housing and Urban Renewal Authority.

1 incident, were ejected from the vehicle. *Id.* Defendant Apolonio, E.T., and K.P. sustained injuries,  
2 while G.C. sustained more serious life-threatening injuries that resulted in her passing away on  
3 June 12, 2024. *Id.* Defendant admitted to not having a driver's license or permit and learned to  
4 drive from his licensed friends. *Id.* Defendant further admitted to drinking every other day in the  
5 past year and obtained alcohol through requesting adults at stores to purchase alcohol for them.  
6  
7 *Id.*

8 Defendant seeks transfer of this matter to the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Defendant  
9 submits that the allegations are serious, but the Defendant also does not have a prior record before  
10 this Court. *Deft's Mot.* at 3. Defendant states that a transfer to Family Court is appropriate, as "the  
11 focus [of Family Court] is on rehabilitation, the rendering of services, and allowing a child to  
12 mature into a contributing adult all while doling out appropriate punitive measures if they become  
13 necessary." *Id.* Defendant is also engaged with the court in his minor capacity, as Child Protective  
14 Services has legal custody over the Defendant in a PINS case in JP0211-24. *Id.*

15  
16  
17 The People oppose transfer to the Family Court on the basis of the seriousness of the  
18 offense, as Defendant's conduct resulted in the death of another minor. *Ppl.'s Opp'n* at 3. "This  
19 is one of the most serious crimes that he could be charged with, and there were no extenuating  
20 circumstances involved." *Id.* Further, the People argue that the Defendant could be rehabilitated  
21 before he turns eighteen (18) years old as he will become an adult in five (5) months. *Id.*

## 22 LAW

23  
24 Guam law provides the relevant law for transferring the complaint or indictment to the  
25 jurisdiction of the Family Court. 19 GCA § 5106(d). Such a transfer shall be made upon "a finding  
26 on clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the minor would be amenable to the  
27  
28

1 care, treatment, and training programs available through the facilities of the juvenile court." *Id.*

2 The Court is instructed to consider the following factors:

- 3
- 4 (1) the age of the minor;
- 5 (2) the history of the minor, including:
- 6 (A) any previous delinquent or criminal history of the minor;
- 7 (B) any previous abuse or neglect history of the minor, and
- 8 (C) any mental health, physical or educational history of the minor, or a
- 9 combination of these factors,
- 10 (3) the circumstances of the offense, including:
- 11 (A) the seriousness of the offense,
- 12 (B) whether the minor is charged through accountability;
- 13 (C) whether there is evidence the offense was committed in an aggressive and
- 14 premeditated manner,
- 15 (D) whether there is evidence the offense caused seriously bodily harm, and
- 16 (E) whether there is evidence the minor possessed a deadly weapon,
- 17 (4) the advantages of treatment within the juvenile justice system, including, whether there
- 18 are facilities or programs, or both, particularly available in the juvenile system,
- 19 (5) whether the security of the public requires sentencing under Title 9, Chapter 80 of the
- 20 Guam Code Annotated,
- 21 (6) the minor's history of services, including the minor's willingness to participate
- 22 meaningfully in available services,
- 23 (7) whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the minor can be rehabilitated before the
- 24 expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction, and
- 25 (8) the adequacy of the punishment or services.

26 *Id.* Guam law also emphasizes that "the court shall give greater weight to the seriousness of the

27 alleged offense and the minor's prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed. . ." *Id.*

## 28 DISCUSSION

### 29 **A. Factors in Consideration of Transferring to Family Court.**

30 Pursuant to 19 GCA § 5106(d), the Court makes the following findings and analysis using

31 the prescribed factors described above:

#### 32 1. Age of Defendant

33 Defendant was seventeen (17) years-old at the time he is alleged to have committed the

34 crime charged and is thus eligible under 19 GCA § 5106 to have his case considered for transfer

35 to the Family Court.

1           2.     History of Defendant

2           Defendant has no prior criminal history in the juvenile justice system. Defendant is  
3 currently under the supervision of the Department of Youth Affairs (“DYA”). DYA indicates to  
4 the Court that the Defendant has no instances or reports of behavioral issues.  
5

6           3.     Circumstances of the offense

7           The charges against the Defendant are particularly serious and grave. Defendant  
8 Apolonio was allegedly intoxicated at the time of the alleged incident. The Defendant asked to  
9 drive the vehicle despite not having a driver’s license or permit. The Defendant’s decision to drink  
10 that evening and to drive while intoxicated led to the death of G.C., a seventeen (17) year old  
11 minor, and injuries to the other three minor passengers. The grave circumstances of the offense  
12 weigh heavily against the Defendant.  
13

14           In considering this factor, the loss of life weighs heavily in the Court’s consideration,  
15 while also balancing the arguments in favor of transfer to the family court due to the Defendant’s  
16 age. The Court is guided by the case of Superior Court of Guam Criminal Case No. CF0411-11,  
17 in which the defendant, who was then only 17-years old, collided into a pole near the Onward  
18 Talofofu Golf Course while he was intoxicated. *Decl. of Prob. Cause, CF0411-11* (Aug. 2, 2011).  
19 Of the five passengers in the car with the defendant, all of whom were minors and suffered injuries  
20 due to the collision, one minor passenger (*Z.J.L.* (DOB: 11/30/1994)) succumbed to injuries and  
21 passed away. *Id.* The defendant was charged as an adult with the following crimes: Manslaughter  
22 (1<sup>st</sup> Degree Felony); Vehicular Homicide (as a 2<sup>nd</sup> Degree Felony); Negligent Homicide (As a 3<sup>rd</sup>  
23 Degree Felony) and Reckless Driving With Injuries (As a Misdemeanor). *Indictment, CF0411-*  
24 *11* (Aug. 9, 2011). On August 7, 2012, the defendant pled guilty to Negligent Homicide (As a  
25 Third Degree Felony) and five counts of Reckless Driving With Injuries (As a Misdemeanor) and  
26  
27  
28

1 sentenced to a suspended sentence of three (3) years' imprisonment as to the Negligent Homicide  
2 charge and a one (1) year concurrent sentence as to the Reckless Driving With Injuries charge.

3 *See Judgment, CF0411-11* (Sept. 24, 2012).<sup>2</sup>

4  
5 Similarly, in Superior Court of Guam Criminal Case No. CF0694-18, the Defendant in  
6 that case was nineteen (19) years of age at the time that the vehicle he was driving ran off the  
7 highway near Turtle Cove, Yona, at estimated speeds of 76 miles per hour, killing two young  
8 passengers in his vehicle. *Decl. of Prob. Cause, CF0694-18* (Nov. 16, 2018). He was charged  
9 with Vehicular Homicide (As a Second Degree Felony) 2 Counts. *Indictment in CF0694-18* (Dec.  
10 3, 2018). On September 19, 2019, the defendant in that case pled guilty two counts of Vehicular  
11 Homicide (As a Second Degree Felony). *Judgment, CF0694-18* (Jan. 31, 2020). As to the first  
12 count, Defendant Taitano was sentenced to six (6) years' imprisonment, all but five (5) years  
13 suspended, with credit for time served; as to the second count, he was sentenced a concurrent  
14 sentence of six (6) years, all but five (5) years suspended, with credit for time served. *Id.* Although  
15 the Defendant in CF0694-18 was an adult over the age of 18 and removal to the Family Court  
16 was not available to him, the Court finds that the difference in age between 17 years old and 19  
17 years old does not particularly warrant disparate favorable treatment under the particular  
18 circumstances in this case.  
19  
20

21  
22 4. Advantages of treatment within the juvenile system

23 The Court recognizes that the Family Division has the ability to provide the supervision  
24 and treatment available under the juvenile system as well as adequate resources to both punish  
25

26  
27 <sup>2</sup> Proceedings in CF0411-11 were well before the enactment of 19 GCA § 5106(d) through P.L. 33-033:2 on June 10,  
28 2015; thus, consideration for removal to the Family Division was not possible at that time. As such, the defendant in  
CF0411-11 was charged as an adult pursuant to 19 GCA § 5106(a): "A child who is sixteen (16) years of age or older  
at the time he committed the offense for which he is charged shall automatically be charged as an adult for any act  
which would constitute a felony of the first or second degree. . .". He was, thus, unable to avail of the benefits of  
proceeding in the Family Court, including that any admission of guilt would not result in a conviction.

1 and service Defendant. If removal were granted, Defendant Apolonio could continue his high  
2 school education with DYA and participate in meaningful services granted by the Family Court.

3  
4 5. Security of the public

5 "In most serious category of cases, the public sense of security and justice require an  
6 assurance that a dangerous offender, or one who has committed a serious crime cannot within a  
7 short time be released."<sup>3</sup> The Court recognizes that the Defendant does not have a criminal  
8 history. The Court further recognizes that the Defendant does not have any history of violence  
9 toward other individuals and does not appear to be a flight risk.

10  
11 The Court notes that a violation report was filed on December 3, 2024, stating that the  
12 Defendant's residence no longer has power and thus was not eligible for the Electronic  
13 Monitoring Program. The Court recognizes that the violation was not due to the Defendant's  
14 conduct but rather the circumstances of his residence. Notwithstanding this finding, the Court  
15 recognizes the grave nature of the offense, as Defendant's alleged conduct resulted in a loss of  
16 life, further exasperated that the loss was a minor. The factor of the security of the public weighs  
17 against the Defendant.

18  
19 6. Minor's history of services

20 Defendant Apolonio is currently receiving services and while in the custody of DYA. At  
21 the Motion hearing, Fred Alig, a Social Worker at the Department of Youth Affairs, reported that  
22 the Defendant had undergone surgery and completed physical therapy. *Min. Entry* (Nov. 22,  
23 2024). Further, Mr. Alig reported that the Defendant underwent a drug and alcohol assessment at  
24 Guam Behavioral Health and Wellness Center ("GBHWC"). *Id.* Defendant receives counseling  
25  
26  
27

28  

---

<sup>3</sup> See Comment on 9 G.C.A. § 80.30.

1 with the Client Services and Family Counseling Division (“CSFC”), as well as completed Moral  
2 Recognition Therapy. *Id.*

3 7. Minor’s rehabilitation before expiration of juvenile court’s jurisdiction

4 19 GCA § 5105 allows continuing jurisdiction of the Family Court until the age of  
5 eighteen (18) or twenty-one (21), depending on the circumstances. If so, the Family Court will  
6 have jurisdiction of Defendant until March 28, 2025, or March 28, 2028.

8 8. Adequacy of punishment or services

9 The offenses charged in this case are second-degree and third-degree felonies. If  
10 convicted, Defendant would be subject to the following maximum sentences: (1) for the First  
11 Charge of Vehicular Homicide (As a Second Degree Felony), pursuant to 9 GCA § 92110(b)(1),  
12 eight (8) years imprisonment; (2) for the Second Charge of Vehicular Homicide While Driving  
13 Impaired (As a Second Degree Felony), pursuant to 9 GCA § 92111(b)(1), no less than eight (8)  
14 years and no more than fifteen (15) years imprisonment; and (3) for the Third Charge of Vehicular  
15 Negligence, pursuant to 9 GCA 92108(d)(1), up to three (3) years imprisonment (as a first  
16 offender under § 92108). In sum, if convicted, the Defendant faces a minimum of eight (8) years  
17 imprisonment and a maximum of fifteen (15) years imprisonment. However, in consideration of  
18 the Defendant as a first offender pursuant to 9 GCA § 80.31(b), the Defendant may face a sentence  
19 of no less than one (1) year and no more than eight (8) years.  
20  
21

22  
23 Based on the factors above, the Court finds that disposition under the Family Court is not  
24 appropriate in this matter. As directed by the statute, the Court gives greater weight to the  
25 seriousness of the offense which resulted in the loss of life. Although this matter is the first matter  
26 in which he is charged as an adult, the Court finds that removal to Family Court would not achieve  
27 the ends of rehabilitation and punishment for the Defendant.  
28

1 **B. The *Adriatico* Decision and Application.**

2 On December 13, 2024, the Guam Supreme Court issued its opinion in *People v.*  
3 *Adriatico*, 2024 Guam 7, in which it addressed the question of whether mandatory life-without-  
4 parole (LWOP) is cruel and unusual punishment when imposed upon a “youthful offender”.<sup>4</sup>  
5 Worthy of note, *inter alia*, is the Court’s holding:  
6

7 We hold that courts should construe, the term “cruel and unusual punishments” as used in  
8 the Guam Bill of Rights with *due regard for the historical, governmental, and cultural*  
9 *values of Guam*. See *Tom*, 533 F.2d at 1104 n.5. This term should not always be given the  
10 same meaning as it represents under the U.S. Constitution. . . . [Cristina M. Quinones-  
11 Betancourt] argues persuasively that where a territory’s objective indicia are omitted from  
the Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency test, an American national consensus  
should not be imposed on the territory.

12 *Adriatico*, 2024 Guam 7 ¶ 62 (emphasis added). The Guam Supreme Court continued its findings  
13 further:

14 We hold that the proper legal standard to be applied is to determine whether mandatory  
15 LWOP<sup>5</sup> for youthful offenders violates “the evolving standards of decency that mark the  
16 progress of a maturing society.” See *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 102 (citations omitted). This is  
17 done by *surveying objective indicia of societal values to determine whether a consensus*  
18 *opposes the application of a specific punishment upon a particular class of defendants*.  
19 See Quinones-Betancourt, *supra*, at 161. . . On the record before us now, we express no  
opinion on how to properly define the boundaries of society, other than *it must include*  
*Guam*.

20 *Adriatico*, 2024 Guam 7 ¶ 65 (emphasis added). The Guam Supreme Court remanded the matter  
21 back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing for the Defendant to “demonstrat[e] how the  
22 evolving science on juvenile maturity and brain development applies to an emerging adult and to  
23 the [Defendant’s] specific circumstances. *Id.* ¶ 68. The trial court was then tasked to “decid[e]

24  
25  
26 <sup>4</sup> Defendant Eligio Adriatico was convicted in two separate cases in CF0085-24 and CF0116-84, of separate charges  
27 of aggravated murder, among other charges. Defendant Adriatico was convicted at twenty (20) years of age. The  
28 SCOG recognized that the term “youthful offender” in federal sentencing guidelines is one “aged 18-25), and that the  
Guam Code’s definition “generally coincides” with this definition “with the notable difference being Guam’s  
definition excludes offenders convicted of crimes punishable by life imprisonment.” *Adriatico* at fn. 4 (citing 9 GCA  
§ 83.15(d)(2005).

<sup>5</sup> “Life-without-parole.”

1 whether imposition of mandatory LWOP sentences for youthful offenders violates Guam's  
2 evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." *Id.* In light of the  
3 *Adriatico* decision, on January 15, 2025, the Court ordered the parties to provide supplemental  
4 briefs addressing whether the *Adriatico* decision has any bearing on this matter.  
5

6 The People submitted their brief on February 18, 2025, noting that *Adriatico* "did not  
7 declare that a life without parole sentence for youthful offenders is cruel and unusual  
8 punishment," but that "the [*Adriatico*] court simply remanded the issue to the trial court so it may  
9 permit arguments on the issue." *Ppl. 's Supp. Brief*, at 2 (Feb. 18, 2025) (emphasis in original).  
10 The trial court would then decide on whether a sentence of life without parole upon a youthful  
11 offender "violates Guam's evolving standards of decency." *Id.* (citing to *Adriatico*, at ¶ 68).  
12

13 The People argue that the statutory sentences in this matter, if the Defendant were  
14 convicted as an adult, would not constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" as considered in  
15 *Adriatico*. The Defendant has avenues to request a reduced sentence through 9 GCA § 80.64 or  
16 the Justice Safety Valve Act, and "the trial court would still be able to consider the Defendant's  
17 status as a "youthful offender" as a mitigating factor during sentence." *Id.* at 3. The People  
18 distinguish this instant matter with *Adriatico* because the sentencing range in this instant case is  
19 not a life sentence or a sentence of life without parole. *Id.* "An *Adriatico* analysis would only be  
20 applicable if the court was contemplating a life without parole sentence." *Id.* The People further  
21 assert that "the Family Court Act sufficiently addresses whether the decertification process is  
22 appropriate. The Legislature has decided that persons aged 16 years old and older accused of first  
23 and second degree felonies shall automatically be certified as adults." *Id.*  
24  
25  
26

27 The Defendant submitted his briefing on February 7, 2025. Defendant first notes that this  
28 case is distinguishable from *Adriatico* because of the distinct sentencing ranges – *Adriatico* dealt

1 with multiple life sentences without parole while this case subjects the Defendant to respective  
2 potential sentencing ranges that does not contemplate life without parole. *See Deft. 's Supp. Brief,*  
3 at 3 (Feb. 7, 2025). Additionally, *Adriatico* analyzed the question of cruel and unusual  
4 punishments in the context of the Constitution and the Guam Bill of Rights, whereas this instant  
5 matter involves the transfer of this matter to Family Court. *Id.*

7 Although the Defendant submits that he is “ill-equipped to provide ‘objective indicia’ of  
8 societal values contemplated in...*Adriatico*” and has not found statistical or scientific data on  
9 Guam’s attitudes toward juvenile or youthful offenders, Defendant “highlight[s] certain laws and  
10 policies already in place.” *Id.*

12 Defendant asserts that Guam statute and legislative history shows that Guam recognizes  
13 the need to distinguish and treat differently juvenile and youthful offenders from adult offenders.  
14 *See Id.* at 4. Defendant cites to the Youth Correction Act, 9 GCA § 83.15(d) that defines “youth  
15 offender.” *Id.* The Youth Correction Act contemplates treatment and suspension of a sentence and  
16 imposition of probation for youthful offenders, evincing that legislators “recognize[d] a  
17 differentiation between more mature decision-making adults and those 25 years old or younger,  
18 including juveniles. *Id.* Although the statute has never been implemented, as Defendant cites from  
19 *Adriatico*, at ¶ 10, fn. 4, “Guam does treat juvenile offenders differently from adult offenders.”  
20 *Id.* Defendant notes Guam’s forward-thinking policies regarding harsh sentences permitted under  
21 the Constitution, such as the abolishment of the death penalty in 1978. *See Id.* at 5.

24 Defendant illustrates how Guam courts approach decisions on a case-by-case basis and  
25 not in a “cookie-cutter fashion.” *Id.* at 6. Although Defendant is subject to automatic certification  
26 as an adult pursuant to 19 GCA § 5105(a), the Court may still transfer jurisdiction of this matter  
27 to the Family Court notwithstanding the certification. *Id.* (citing 19 GCA § 5106(d)).  
28

1           Although *Adriatico* may be distinguished from this case as it addressed the specific  
2 punishment of Life Without Parole (LWOP), the rationale of the Supreme Court on the question  
3 of whether certain punishment imposed upon a “youthful offender” constitutes “cruel-and-  
4 unusual-punishment”, including, in this case where Defendant – who was 17 years old at the time  
5 of the alleged offenses – is subject to (1) a maximum term of 8 years of incarceration for Vehicular  
6 Homicide (as a 2<sup>nd</sup> Degree Felony); (2) a mandatory minimum term of incarceration of 8 years  
7 and a maximum of 15 years for Vehicular Homicide While Driving Impaired (as a 2<sup>nd</sup> Degree  
8 Felony); and (3) a maximum term of incarceration of 3 years for Vehicular Negligence (as a 3<sup>rd</sup>  
9 Degree Felony).  
10  
11

12           *Adriatico* also implicitly raises the question of whether the imposition of the punishment  
13 for which the Defendant could be sentenced, if convicted, without the benefit of the Youth  
14 Correction Act, Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, Chapter 83, constitutes cruel and unusual  
15 punishment under *Adriatico*.  
16

17           Having considered the additional briefs of the party and the rationale behind the  
18 Legislature’s enactment of 19 GCA § 5106(d) permitting removal to the Family Court under  
19 certain specific circumstances, the Court finds that *Adriatico*’s relevance in this matter is limited  
20 to the sentencing phase of this proceeding and is not directly relevant to the instant Motion.  
21

22 //  
23 //  
24 //  
25 //  
26 //  
27 //  
28 //

1 **CONCLUSION**

2 Based upon the Court's findings of clear and convincing evidence that transferring this  
3 case to the Family Court would not be appropriate under these circumstances, the Court DENIES  
4 Defendant's Motion for Removal to Family Court.  
5

6 The Court shall issue a Criminal Trial Scheduling Order under separate cover.

7 **SO ORDERED** this 5<sup>th</sup> day of March, 2026.  
8

9 

10  
11 **HONORABLE MARIA T. CENZON**  
12 Judge, Superior Court of Guam  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23

24 **SERVICE VIA E-MAIL**

25 I acknowledge that an electronic  
copy of the original was e-mailed to:

26 AG, PDSC

27 Date: 3/5/26 Time: 3:52 pm

28 Antonio Cruz  
Deputy Clerk, Superior Court of Guam